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Criminal Justice for All
Deborah Tuerkheimer
This is a critical juncture for criminal law scholarship. It is not hyperbolic to 
assert that our criminal justice system is very much in crisis. Just as important, 
this crisis is widely acknowledged outside of the legal academy—so much so 
that, notwithstanding meaningful variation in how the problem is diagnosed, 
we see almost universal agreement throughout scholarly, popular, and political 
discourse: The criminal justice system needs fi xing.
My aim here is not to document this need, but rather to consider the 
function of legal scholarship in, fi rst, exposing the limits of criminal law as it 
operates on the ground and, next, generating a path forward. 
As a starting point, we might briefl y take stock of the ongoing crisis. It turns 
out that much of the received wisdom upon which the criminal process relies 
has been undermined.1 We can usefully disaggregate contemporary criminal 
justice critique by observing three distinct (albeit overlapping) categories of 
concern. One is the concern for mass incarceration and its collateral eff ects, 
which is primarily—but by no means exclusively2—focused on the criminal 
justice system’s grossly disproportionate impact on African-American men and 
1. See Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L. J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PRO. iii (2015). Judge 
Kozinski identifi es a dozen revelations that have signifi cantly undermined conventionally 
accepted criminal law truths. For instance, we now have good reason to question the 
reliability of certain key categories of evidence, including eyewitness identifi cations, forensic 
science, human memory, and confessions. Similarly, recent developments have cast in doubt 
whether, for the most part, jurors follow instructions, prosecutors comply with discovery 
obligations, police offi  cers are objective, guilty pleas equate with actual guilt, and the burden 
of proof functions as it ought. Last, empirical evidence has challenged the deterrent value of 
long-term incarceration. As Judge Kozinski puts it, “We may be spending scarce taxpayer 
dollars maintaining the largest prison population in the industrialized world, shattering 
countless lives and families, for no good reason.” Id. at xiii. 
2. See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS 258 (2015) (“[N]umerous people are serving time today for nonviolent off enses, 
many of them property or petty drug off enses, that would not warrant a sentence in many 
other countries.”). 
Journal of Legal Education, Volume 66, Number 1 (Autumn 2016)
Deborah Tuerkheimer is a Professor of Law at Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. 
The author is grateful to Robin West, Jeremy Paul, Margaret Woo, and Kellye Testy for the invita-
tion to speak at the Journal of Legal Education Symposium on The Future of Legal Scholarship, 
to Northeastern Law School for hosting the Symposium, to Kate O’Neill for excellent editorial 
suggestions, and to Paul Butler for insightful comments on an earlier draft.
25
its ravaging of communities of color. 3 Another is the concern about wrongful 
convictions, including convictions of the factually innocent.4 And last is the 
concern for unremediated injury—for harms that remain beyond the reach of 
the criminal law5—including unpunished sexual violence.6
These three strands of the dominant criminal justice critique have been, 
and continue to be, shaped by forces outside of the legal academy, to be sure. 
(Note, for instance, the infl uence of social movements like Black Lives Matter, 
sex-positive feminism, and LGBTQ advocacy.) But criminal law scholars have 
also played a pivotal role in bringing this critique to the fore—which is to say, 
beyond the bounds of academic discourse. Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim 
Crow is an excellent example,7 but there are many others. Because the question 
of scholarly impact is an increasingly pressing one (rightly so), this point is 
worth stressing.
At its best, criminal law scholarship, whether descriptive or overtly 
normative,8 promises to further the justice promised by the criminal justice 
system. This leaning is almost inevitable when the status quo is so deeply 
fl awed—a consequence of the grim fact that our system is, in so many ways, 
not functioning as it should. Sustained scholarly attention to the criminal 
law—via sophisticated doctrinal analysis, groundbreaking empirical work, or 
3. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLOR BLINDNESS (2010); PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 
(2010); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American 
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004); Alexandra Natapoff , Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1313 (2012). 
4. See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 93 MINN L. REV. 1629 (2008); Brandon L. Garrett, 
Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. (2008); Susan Bandes, Framing Wrongful Convictions, 
5 UTAH L. REV. (2008); Daniel Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549. See also 
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2470 (2004) 
(arguing that structural features of our adversary system distort the plea bargaining process). 
5. As Mari Matsuda has written, “[t]he kinds of injuries and harms historically left to private 
individuals to absorb and resist through private means is no accident. The places where 
the law does not go to redress harm have tended to be the places where women, children, 
people of color, and poor people live.” Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: 
Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2321-22 (1989). For a seminal treatment 
of women’s overlooked injuries, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal 
Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151 (1995) (describing how “the criminal justice system is dominated 
(incontrovertibly so) by a preoccupation with men and male perspectives.”). For more 
recent eff orts to explore the enforcement-related implications of unremediated harm, see 
Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 878-80 (2014) (presenting and 
analyzing empirical data on the underenforcement of hate crimes laws). 
6. Unremediated injury is the target of contemporary rape law reform, which seeks to upend 
a legal regime that still allows the vast majority of sexual violence to go unpunished. See 
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2750084. 
7. See supra note 3.
8. See Robin West, The Contested Value of Normative Legal Scholarship, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 6 (2016).
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the design of grand theory—is bound to open new frames for conceiving and 
eff ecting change.
Still, even in an era of great cultural and political receptivity to prescriptive 
claims, I must temper this view of criminal law scholarship as integral 
to reconstructing our faulty system. My worry is that scholarly eff orts to 
transform criminal justice will be jettisoned by those whose critical approaches 
are most desperately needed in this regard. Returning to the three strands of 
contemporary criminal justice critique (again, mass incarceration, wrongful 
convictions, and overlooked injury), a core defect that binds together each 
area of concern is the neglect of marginalized perspectives. Attention to these 
perspectives is the hallmark of progressive criminal law scholarship. Yet in its 
most radical—and some would say powerful—instantiation, the criminal justice 
critique is an argument, not just for ratcheting down the carceral state, but for 
abandoning it altogether. 
I understand the appeal of repudiating the criminal justice system, whether 
because of its generalized failings (the system is corrupt/racist/patriarchal; 
it always will be) or based on more narrow grounds (the corrupt/racist/
patriarchal system will never respond to X crime). And I appreciate why 
scholars committed to improving the lot of the most vulnerable among us 
might not view the criminal law—particularly in its current incarnation—as 
especially worthy of intellectual investment in reform.9 That said, I believe 
this investment is more than justifi able; it is crucial. If critical scholarship 
on criminal justice ceases to contest the why and how of criminalization and 
punishment, the system and the interests it protects will be left intact.10 
Scholarly disengagement with the workings of our criminal justice system 
is not the best course, in my opinion, and I say this only partly for pragmatic 
reasons.11 For me, the primary impulse—indeed, the imperative—to reorient, 
rather than ignore or forsake, criminal justice is rooted in our rights as equal 
citizens. Victoria Nourse, over a decade ago, wrote:
Once upon a time, we thought that the family was a place of privacy, a place 
where, without question, individuals existed apart from the state. Feminism 
9. Recent moves to center vulnerability in legal scholarship can be attributed largely to 
the work of Martha Fineman. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the 
Responsive State, 60 EMORY L. J. 10 (2010); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: 
Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008). 
10. On occasion, critical scholarship challenges the need for criminal law enforcement while 
off ering alternatives that would not simply leave the system intact. For one signifi cant eff ort 
to theorize the absence of criminal law, see Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded 
Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1167-68 (2015) (off ering an “aspirational ethical, institutional, 
and political framework that aims to fundamentally reconceptualize security and collective 
social life, rather than simply a plan to tear down prison walls.”). McLeod provides a 
rich account of why we should gradually displace criminal law enforcement with other 
mechanisms of justice, ultimately “render[ing] ‘prisons obsolete.’” Id. at 1168.
11. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1701-05 (1990) 
(discussing the problem of transition from the present to the ideal).
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changed that, at least in part, by reimagining the family as a set of gendered, 
and therefore potentially subordinating, relations. I urge that the criminal law 
be subjected to a similar intellectual transformation, to an imagined economy 
of relations between citizens and state.12
This imagined economy raises formidable questions (doctrinal and theoretical, 
substantive and procedural) that lie at the heart of public law.13
Conceptualizing criminal law as, inevitably, a site of entrenched inequalities 
and steep power diff erentials shows why it is a mistake to desert systemic 
reform. Criminal law is an “institution of governance,”14 in the end, mediating 
relations between the individual and the state, just as it mediates relations 
among individuals. These relations can be just or they can be unjust, and they 
can be more or less equal; regardless, they will endure. 
This proposition sounds abstract, but it is quite tangible to many who 
work in the trenches of criminal justice. When I served as an Assistant District 
Attorney in New York County, I was—every day—acutely aware that the 
proceedings and their eventual outcomes were forging relationships between 
crime victims and the state, between criminal defendants and the state, and 
between crime victims and crime perpetrators. So too was I painfully attentive 
to the hierarchical nature of these ongoing relationships, along with their 
potential to empower and to disempower. Ultimately, at least to my mind, the 
meaning of justice in any given case was contingent on this trio of relationships. 
I tried to take them into account; I tried to promote their best expression. 
Even so, in these endeavors there were constraints, to say the least. 
For example, as a domestic violence prosecutor, I was often struck by the 
vast terrain of suff ering that lay outside the bounds of law. Criminal statutes 
are premised on a transactional model of crime that decontextualizes violence. 
The law thereby conceals the realities of domestic violence, which is defi ned by 
an ongoing pattern of conduct featuring power and control.15 Unsurprisingly 
then, prosecutors who handle domestic violence cases often hear from victims 
that the crime charged did not constitute the worst of the abuse, usually 
followed by a painful story of what did. 
In recounting their suff ering at the hands of an intimate, battered women 
might reasonably expect understanding and beyond that—remediation, a fuller 
measure of justice. But prosecutors must explain that the law criminalizes only 
a sliver of what was endured. Victims thus learn that the criminal law does 
12. V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1697 (2003).
13. Id. at 1739-40. 
14. Id.
15. In an earlier piece, I fully developed this argument and proposed a “course of conduct” 
statute that would address the shortcomings identifi ed. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959 (2004). I have since refi ned the proposal. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Renewing the Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence: An Assessment Three Years Later, 75 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 613 (2007); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Breakups, 25 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 51 (2013).
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not recognize their violation; nor does it hold abusers truly accountable. As a 
result, violent domination goes unchecked. To those involved in a case, this is 
more than a theoretical claim: the state is wholly complicit in the arrangement.16
In every criminal prosecution, moreover, there exists a relationship between 
the state and the defendant; this relationship also squarely implicates equality 
norms. While a prosecution can undermine these norms, compassionate 
treatment of a defendant may mitigate this eff ect. In my experience, nowhere 
was this possibility more apparent than in New York County’s juvenile 
off ender court, where those granted “youthful off ender” treatment were closely 
monitored, both by a judge who genuinely cared about their future selves 
and by prosecutors willing to contemplate the fullness of each individual 
defendant’s life. I am quite certain that these factors aff ected not only the 
ultimate resolution of their cases, but also how defendants perceived the 
legitimacy of the criminal process and their own standing vis-à-vis the state. 
The same could be said for cases in which prosecutors arranged to meet with 
defendants and their attorneys to hear—and factor in—the defendant’s version 
of the incident and his life circumstances. And the same is true of cases in 
which prosecutorial charging decisions and plea negotiations refl ected mercy 
that too often was in tension with the penalties authorized by law. From the 
defendant’s perspective, the state can be empathetic or ruthless, principled or 
arbitrary.
My experiences as a prosecutor certainly inform my belief in the importance 
of critical scholarship on the criminal justice system.17 While this kind of 
scholarship has always served a valuable function, it is especially meaningful 
now, when we fi nd ourselves at an opportune moment to rethink the very 
mission of criminal law, and then its implementation. Framed by norms of 
citizenship and equality, criminal law scholarship is uniquely poised to advance 
understandings of what it means for substantive prohibitions and defenses to 
be just; for mechanisms of enforcement to be fair and eff ective; and for our 
methods of punishment to be sparing and humane.
16. Relatedly, in support of a protection-based understanding of the Equal Protection Clause, 
Robin West has argued:
[T]he master-slave relationship can be defi ned, and often has been defi ned, as a 
private relationship in which the violent assault by the master of the slave is not a 
criminal off ense (but not vice versa), such that the assaulted slave has no recourse 
against the assaultive master, no rights that were violated . . . . Unlike the citizen 
who is protected against such violence, betrayal, and violation, the only way for 
the slave to avoid the violence of the master or the threat of starvation attendant 
to his betrayal and violations of trust is for the master’s command to be obeyed, 
his will to be accommodated. This denial of protection against the violence and 
violation of a master is what defi nes, to say nothing of legitimizes, the master-
slave relationship.
Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 111, 
128 (1991).
17. See, e.g., supra notes 2-5. For a critique of incremental reform that fails to challenge underlying 
systems of oppression, see Paul Butler, The System is Working the Way It’s Supposed To: The Limits of 
Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L. J. 1419 (2016).
